PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.

ADOPTION.

The statute law of Illinois, similar to that of most states,
allows an illegitimate child to inherit from the mother, and
Inheritane
by Adopted

Parent

with respect to adoptive parents provides that

they shall inherit from an adopted child such
property with the accumulations and profits as

shall have been taken by the adopted child through its adoptive parents. In Swick v. Coleman, 75 N. E. 807, the
Supreme Court of that state, contruing these statutes with
reference to the facts there presented, holds that where an
adoptive illegitimate child receives by devise from an adoptive parent a farm, and sells the same and has the proceeds
on hand at the time of her death, leaving an illegitimate child
which survives only a few months the heirs of the adoptive
parent and not the natural mother of the adoptive child, will
inherit. The decision presents an interesting review of the
question involved and is apparently a case of first impression. Compare Humphreys v. Davis, ioo Ind. 274.

ADVANCEMENTS.

In Appeal of Malony, 62 Atl. 15i, the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut decides that a loan made by a father
to his son may not be converted by the father
Lo--s
into an advancement without the consent and
against the will of the son; but in order to effect such a
change there must be a meeting of the minds between the
father and the son such as to create a new contractual status.
Compare Sherwood v. Smith, 23 Conn. 516.
13
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ANIMALS.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds in Barklow
v. Avery, 89 S. W. 417, that the owner of premises, who
allows his porter to keep a vicious dog on the

* premises knowing of its viciousness, is liable for
damages caused by it. Compare Harrisv. Fisher, 20 S. E.
461.

ASSIGNMENTS.

In Ray v. Nally et al., 89 S. W. 486, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky holds that a purchaser of land, over
Rights as
which a passage way used by another runs, is
Against
Purchasers

charged with notice of that other's right to the

passage way.
BANKRUPTCY.

The United States District Court (E. D. Pennsylvania)
holds in In re Thackara Mfg. Co., 14o Fed. 126, that a
Levy of
Execution

judgment creditor of an insolvent corporation,
who, after the issuance and levy of an execution,

had the same held by the sheriff for several months to obtain
the advantages of the security, while payments were being
made from time to time by the debtor, lost the lien of the
levy as against other creditors under the law of Pennsylvania, and on the bankruptcy of the corporation, more than
four months after the levy, such creditor is not entitled to
priority of payment from the proceeds of the property levied
on.
IT re Wynheld, Mfg. Co., 14o Fed. 185, the United
States District Court, (E. D. Pennsylvania) decides that
the time of filing a petition in bankruptcy fixes
Claim or
the status of persons entitled to priority under
Rent
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and a provision
of a lease to a bankrupt that, in case of his insolvency
or the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by or against
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BANKRUPTCY (Continued).

him the rent for the entire term shall become at once
due and payable, and that the landlord may proceed as
in case of breach, does not entitle the landlord to priority
for the rent for the unexpired portion of the term, although
under the state law he would be entitled to such priority
in the distribution of the proceeds of the lessee's property
when sold in insolvency proceedings. Compare Wilson v.
Trust Co., 114 Fed. 742.

CARRIERS.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides in Illinois
Cent. Ry. Co. v. Allen, 89 S. W. I5O, that the duty of a
carrier of passengers is to attend to the comforts
Duty to
passengers

and safety of all its passengers alike, but not

to furnish especial attention to any one in particular, unless
under exceptional circumstances, such as sickness en route;
but, if a carrier voluntarily accepts a helpless passenger without an attendant, it will assume the additional care commensurate with his needs. The railroad, it is held, is justified
in refusing to sell a ticket to a blind man unless he secures an
attendant where his trip would have involved a change of
cars, and he would have had to rely for assistance on the
employees in charge of the train.
Compare Illinois Cent.
Ry. Co. v. Smith, 37 S. 643.
In Gilman v. Postal Telegraph Co., 95 N. Y. Supp. 564,
the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Term) decides
that where a messenger company had installed

call boxes in houses, and was engaged in the
carriage of small hand packages by means
of
messenger boys sent in response to calls, for hire, it was not
liable as a common carrier for the safe transportation of a
package containing money intrusted to a messenger sent in
response to a call, without notice that the package to be
carried contained money. Compare Sewall v. Allen, 6
Wend.335.
oressener

es
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CEMETERIES.

In Weiss et al. v. Taylor et al., 39 S. 519, the Supreme
Court of Alabama holds that the heirs at law of the owner
of a burying lot in a cemetery adjoining a
Rights in
Burial Lots

public thoroughfare therein, members of the

family being buried in the lot, had such a special interest as
to entitle them to maintain a bill to remove obstructions in
the thoroughfare adjoining the lot.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

An attempted extension of the "Jim Crow" car legislation appears in State v. Patterson, 39 S. 398, where the
Supreme Court of Florida holds that an act
Race Dis-

crilnatlon

requiring street car companies to provide sep-

arate compartments in their cars for the Caucasian and
African races, and that under penalties prohibits persons of
either of said races from occupying the compartment of a
car set apart for the other race, but with the proviso "that
the provisions of this act shall not apply to colored nurses
having the care of white children or sick white persons,"
violates section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, and is void. The proviso is the
ground of distinction between this case and those which have
permitted the requirement to separate accommodations for
the two races. Compare Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe
Co., 184 U. S. 540.
The United States Supreme Court decides in Tampa
Waterworks Co. v. City of Tampa, 26 S. C. R. 23, that a
- provision of a state constitution giving the legisSelf
lature full power to correct abuses, and prevent
Povision:
Contracts
unjust discrimination and excessive charges, is
self-executing to the extent that contracts made after it went
into effect are subject to the possibility of the exercise of
such power. Compare Bienville Water Supply Co. v.
Mobile, 186 U. S. 212. Two judges dissent.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

The Supreme Court of the United States decides in Beryl
F. Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Company of New York
et al., 26 S. C. R. 66, that insurance companies
Insurance
Companies
doing business in Iowa cannot claim to be deprived of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Contitution by the statutory law, making it unlawful for them or their officers, agents, or
employees to make or enter into any combination or agreement relating to the rates to be charged, the amount of commission to be allowed agents, or the manner of transacting
their business within the state, in the absence of any judicial
construction of such statute as having any other than the
single object to insure competition. See in connection
herewith Fidelity Mutual Life Ass'n. v. Mettler, 185
U. S. 308.An important decision is handed down by the Supreme
Court of the United States involving the conflicting powers
of the Federal and State governments in State
Federal
License Tax
of South Carolinav. United States, 26 S. C. R.
i io. It is there held that the United States may, under.the
Federal Constitution, exact the license taxes prescribed by
the internal revenue laws for.dealers in intoxicating liquors
from the dispensing and selling agents of a state which, in
the exercise of its sovereign power, has taken charge of the
business of selling such liquors. Three judges dissent.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island decides in Gunn v.
Union R. Co., 62 Atl. i18, that the provisions of the Federal
Constitution prohibiting a state from depriving
Tria by
Jury
any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, or denying to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law, do not require
a trial by jury in suits at common law in a state court.
Compare the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

Against the dissent of two judges the Supreme Court of
Iowa decides in Shaw v. City Council of Marshalltown et al,
104 N. W. 1121, that the statute of the state
Fourteenth
Amendment:

providing for preference of honorably discharged soldiers and sailors of the Civil War, residents of
the state, in appointment, employment, and promotion in
public service over others of equal qualifications, is not
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, declaring that no state shall make or enforce any
law abridging the priviliges or immunities of the citizens of
the United States; such privileges and immunities being
those of citizens of the United States as distinguished from
citizens of a state. Compare however Brown v. Russell,
166 Mass. 14.

The Supreme Court of California decides in Greenberg
v. Western Turf Association, 82 Pac. 684, that a statute
making it unlawful to refuse admission to any
Public
Amusements opera house, theatre, race course, or other place
of public amusement to any -person over twenty-one years
of age who presents a ticket of admission, and providing a
penalty therefore, was a valid exercise of the State's police
power, and was not unconstitutional, as a deprivation of
civil rights conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Compare the recent Pennsylvania decision, referred to in the February issue of the, LAW
REGISTER, Homey v. Nixon, 213 Pa. 20.
DAMAGES.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina decides in
Milhouse y. Southern 52 S. E. 41, that where an engineer
wilfully passes a flag station, seeing a passenger
Failur, to
Stopat
standing there, the latter can recover punitive
Station

damages.

It is further held that in estimating

damages -for failure of a train to stop for a passenger at
a flag station, inconvenience, the direct cause of the negligence, may be considered in estimating the damages.
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DOMICILE.

In Gordon v. Yost, 14o Fed., 79, the United States Circuit Court (N. D. West Virginia) decides that the rule that
the domicile of the husband is that of the wife
Citizenship
of Wife
does not apply in cases of desertion by the husband, and in such case the wife may be a resident and
citizen of a different state from her husband for the purposes
of a suit by her in a federal court to recover for the alienation of his affections and causing his desertion. Compare
Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. io8.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

The United States Supreme Court holds in California
Reduction Company et al. v. Sanitary Reduction Works of
San Francisco, 26 S. C. R. ioo, that municipal
Municilpal
Disposal of
ordinances requiring all garbage and other
arbage
refuse matter to be delivered at a specified
crematory or reduction plant, there to be cremated or destroyed at the expense of the person, company, or corporation conveying the same, are not wanting in the due process
of the law required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as taking private property for
public use without compensation, even if some of the substances so destroyed may have had some elements of value.
Justices Brewer and Peckman dissent. Compare with this
decision the case immediately following with reference to a
similar matter, Gardner v. Michigan, 26 S. C. R. io6.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

The Supreme Court of Appeals. of Virginia decides in
Great Falls Power Co. v. Great Falls & 0. D. R. Co., 52
S. E. 172, that a taking of land belonging to
a corporation possessing the power of eminent
domain by a railway company for a park at its termina!.,
attractive to pleasure seekers because of its scenic features,
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EMINENT DOMAIN (Continued).

is not taking of land for a public use. Compare In re
NiagaraFalls & W. Ry. Co., io8 N. Y. 375.
EVIDENCE.

The Supreme Court of Montana decides in Chan v.

Slater, 82 Pac. 657, that on the issue of whether a wife's
title to property was merely colorable, and was
Title to

Property

held by her solely to shield such property from
her husband's creditors, declarations of the hus-

band, made by him while in exclusive possession and control of the property, that he was the owner thereof, although
not made in the wife's presence, were admissible against
her, not as absolutely binding upon her but as substantive
evidence reflecting upon the bona fides of her claim. Compare Gallick v. Bordeaux, et al., 22 Mont. 470.
It is always difficult to decide how far the statements of
bystanders, made at or near the time of an occurrence, who
take no part in a transaction are admissible
Res Qt
under the res gestw rule, and a new decision on
this point is always welcome. In Baysinger v. Territory,
82 Pac. 728, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma decides that
where a declaration or statement is made by a bystander
during the progress of an altercation, which results in one of
the parties shooting and killing the other, and which remark
gives character to an act of the accused, which act is a proper subject of proof on the trial, such statement may be introduced in evidence as part of the res gesta.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

In Kelly v. Odum, et al., 51 S. E. 953, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina decides that an executor is always
personally liable to his attorney for his fee or
Attorney's
Fees
compensation. Compare McKay v. Royal, 52
N. C. 426.
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FEDERAL COURTS.

The United States Supreme Court holds in Francis B.
Sweeney v. Carter Oil Company, 26 S. C. R. 56, that two
citizens of different states may maintain an
Diverse
Citizenship
action against a citizen
a third state in the
of Parties
Federal circuit court for of
the district of the latter's residence under the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. at
L. 552, Chap. 373), as corrected by the act of August 13,
I888 (25 Stat. at L. 433, Chap. 866 U. S. Comp. Stat. 19O1,
p. 5o8), conferring original jurisdiction on the circuit courts
of suits in which there is a controversy between citizens of
different states, to be brought in the district of the resideuce
of either the plaintiff or the defendant. Compare Smith v.
Lyon, 133 U. S. 315.
FOOD.

The Supreme Court of Missouri in City of St. Louis v.
Schuler, 89 S. W. 621, that an ordinance prohibiting the
sale of milk containing a preservative is within
Regulating
Sale
the power of a municipality to pass ordinances
necessary or reasonably appearing to be necessary for the
public health, even though a preservative not injurious to
health might be used. Compare herewith the decision of
the Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Biesecker,
•I61 N. Y. 53FORCIBLE ENTRY.

The Supreme Court of Georgia decides in Ellis v. State,
E. 147 that where a tenant leaves the premises at the
Forcible
end of his term, the landlord, though not in
Entry: Wht
ottutes
actual occupancy, is to be regarded as in possession, and a third person who enters without the landlord's consent, and violently keeps possession, with menaces,
force, and arms, and without authority of law, is guilty of
forcible detainer. To constitute such offence it is not necessary that the person who has so taken possession should
52 S.
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FORCIBLE ENTRY (Continued).

actually assault the landlord; but if, when the landlord seeks
to re-enter, the conduct of such person in keeping possession
and the circumstances connected therewith be such as are
reasonably calculated to cause the landlord to believe that,
if he should persist in the attempt to re-enter he would be
subjected to physical violence, the offence would be complete. Compare Williams v. State, 12o Ga. 488.
HABEAS CORPUS.

The Supreme Court of Indiana holds in Willis v. Willis,
75 N. E. 655, that where petitioner in habeas corpus proCourts:

Jurisdictioa

ceedings for the custody of a child violated the
order of court awarding her such custody by

moving with the child into another county, respondent to
the proceedings should have applied for relief to the court
whose order was violated, and not to the court of the county
to which the petitioner removed. It is further laid down
that the doctrine of res judicata applies to habeas corpus
proceedings to obtain the custody of a child; though with
respect to this latter proposition a change in the conditions
affecting the welfare of the child would probably authorize
a re-opening of the case. Compare Brooke v. Logan, 112
Ind. 183.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

The Appellate Court of Indiana (Division No. i) decides
in Gregg v. Gregg, 75 N. E. 674 that a divorced wife is
entitled to maintain an action against her former
Affection:
Alienation
mother-in-law for alienation of the affections of
her husband by acts maliciously done, which were calculated
to produce such result. It is further held by the-court that
in a suit by a wife for alienation of the affections of her husband, the law presumes generally that the husband has conjugal affection for his wife, and the burden is on the defendant to prove the contrary. Compare Postlethwaite v.
Postlethwaite, 28 N. E. 99.
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LICENSES.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Levy v.
Louisville Gunning System, 89 S. W. 528, that where the
owner of a building executed a license for a term
Revocation

at a specified rent for the use of one of its walls

for advertising purposes, such license was not revoked by
the owner's execution of a lease of the building to plaintiff's
assignor, which did not mention such license. Compare
7 Wait's A. &. D. 209.
MARRIAGE.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee, though holding that
the statutory law of the state precludes the recognition by
Common Law the court of the validity of a common law marMarriage
riage, nevertheless holds in Smith v. North
Memphis Savings Bank, 89 S. W. 392, that where plaintiff
and deceased had lived together and recognized each other
as man and wife and so held each other out to the world for
more than twenty-five years, deceased, if living, would be
estopped from asserting that they had not been legally
married and hence, in a proceeding by plaintiff, to enforce her
marital rights as widow against his estate, it would be presumed, as against his administrators that they were legally
married. Compare herewith the case of Johnson v. Johnson, i Cold. 630.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

In Zambelli v. F. Johnson & Son Co., 39 S. 5O1, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana decides that it is negligence
for the driver of a team of horses to abandon
Liability of
Master

his seat upon the box and his hold upon the

reins, and to leave his team standing in a frequented place;
and where it appears probable that they might have been controlled if he had been in the proper position to control them,
his employer will be held liable in damages for injury inflicted
by them upon a third person in running away. Compare
Shawhan Case, 24 La. Ann. 390.
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PARDON.

The Supreme Court of Colorado (Division B), holding
in Ex. Parte Alvarez, 39 S. 481, that the law is settled
that, where a criminal accepts a pardon he
Conditions
accepts its valid conditions and limitations, and
will be held bound to a compliance therewith, decides further,
that where conditional pardons expressly provide that upon
violation of the conditions the offender shall be liable to
summary arrest and recommitment for the unexpired portion
of his original sentence, such stipulations, upon acceptance
of the pardon, become binding upon the convict, and
authorize his rearrest and recommitment upon the terms
imposed, and authorize such arrest and recommitment in the
manner and by or through the official authority as stipulated
in the pardon.
RAILROADS.

In Harry Donovan v. Pennsylvania Company, 26 S. C.
R. 91, the Supreme Court of the United States holds that
a railway
company which has made an arrangee

Excluding

lackumenfrom

ment with a transfer company to furnish at its

passenger station all the vehicles necessary for
the accommodation of the passengers arriving
there on its trains or on the trains of other railroad companies using the station may legally exclude from the station
and depot grounds all other hackmen or cabmen seeking
entrance for the purpose of soliciting for themselves the
custom or patronage of passengers. Compare Pennsylvania Company v. Chicago, 181 Ill. 289, 53 L. R. A. 223.
Railw

^

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
First Department), decides in Clements v. Sherwood-Dunn
et al., 95 N. Y. Supp. 766, that an action to
Contracts to
Delver
Stock

compel specific performance of- a contract to

deliver stock in a specific corporation, which

plaintiff has no special interest in acquiring, except for the
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pecuniary advantage which will accrue to him from its ownership, cannot be maintained simply because it appears that
there have been no sales of the stock in question, that it is not
listed on any exchange, and that defendant is the owner of a
large majority of the stock, so that it will be difficult,
although not impossible, to ascertain its value. See in connection herewith Butler v. Wright, 93, N. Y. Supp. 128.
WILLS.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina holds in Tussey
et al. v. Owen, 52 S. E. 128, that the contract of an adult
Contracts

child with her old and afflicted father to remain

with and work for him during his lifetime, he.
in consideration, to will her one-fourth of his property
requires her, unless prevented by him or those acting for
him, to remain with and serve him till his death. The court
further decides that such contract is entire and indivisible
and where she leaves him before his death it includes no
implied contract to pay for the benefit conferred by her
during the time she served him. Compare Dermott v. Jones,

to Devise

23 How. 220.
WITNESSES.

In John D. Jack v. State of Kansas, 2o S. C. R. 73 the
United States Supreme Court holds that the danger that the
f: testimony given in an examination under the
PrIv.le
IIM unty
state statutory law, might incriminate the witness as a violator of the Federal anti-trust law and of the
possible use, in a Federal prosecution for a violation of such
statute, of the testimony given in the state proceeding, is so
unsubstantial and remote as not to make an imprisonment
for refusal to testify a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law, where the statute is construed by the state
courts to render material only such questions as relate to
transactions within the state, and grants full immunity from
prosecution in the state courts. Two judges dissent.
Compare Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547.

